Analysis of Developments in the Space Domain
28 Nov 2025: After months of operating in proximity with one another Cosmos 2589 (64467) and Cosmos 2590 (64527) appear to be heading their separate ways. Cosmos 2589 began conducting maneuvers to circularize its orbit on 19 Nov 2025 when it began lowering its apogee and raising its perigee. Since that time Russian space operators have begun to maneuver the satellite every 12 hours. Cosmos 2589’s eccentricity has begun to decrease and has gone from 0.365 on 19 Nov to 0.350 on 28 Nov. I expect the maneuvers will continue over the next several weeks and to eventually get to ~0.0 (nearly a perfect circle). Once 2589’s orbit has been circularized the satellite will have finally joined the Geosynchronous belt and be able to conduct inspection missions of other satellites in that orbital regime. For its part Cosmos 2590 maneuvered between 14-19 November to increase its eccentricity. Prior to the 19 Nov maneuvers Cosmos 2589 and 2590 maintained a separation distance of <10km. As of 28 Nov the satellites are more than 20,000km apart.
Background
Recent Maneuvers
-The question now becomes how long will it take for Russia to maneuver Cosmos 2589 from its Geosynchronous Highly Elliptical Orbit to a more standard Geosynchronous orbit. We don’t know exactly, previous Russian satellites that have followed this flight profile required between 3-6 months.
Editor’s Comment: It appears Russia conducted a final operations test of Cosmos 2590 from 2-14 Nov 2025 having the satellite remain <2km from Cosmos 2589 for extended periods of time. With testing objectives met (an assumption) Russia has moved to a new phase of operations with Cosmos 2589. I expect Cosmos 2589 to continue to lower its apogee and raise its perigee for the next 3-6 months, eventually circularizing into Geosynchronous Orbit. Several questions remain: 1) how will Cosmos 2589 operate in GEO…will it continuously roam similar to China’s SY-12 inspector satellites or drift to specific target satellites and then remain in proximity for several months, similar to Russia’s Luch/Olymp; 2) Will Cosmos 2589 release additional sub-satellites once in GEO; 3) will Cosmos 2590 release its own sub-satellite/projectile as we’ve noted with Nivelir satellites in LEO; and 4) will Russia maneuver or conduct further testing with Cosmos 2590. I think we have a reasonable chance to answer all of these questions in the coming months. Stay Tuned!
5 Dec 2025: After having docked on 2 July 2025 it appears SJ-21 (49330) and SJ-25 (62485) successfully detached from one another. The Joint Commercial Operations Cell first reported the potential separation on 28 November, then the amazing s2a systems published an image showing two distinct dots confirming separation on 29 November. Based on published TLE data from Spacetrack.org and SBMS from Saberastro, the two satellites were separated by ~30km on 30 November. From 1-5 December both satellites maneuvered to initiate RPO conditions with one another with occasional close approaches of <1km. The situation remains fluid and I expect more maneuvering from both satellites in the coming days/weeks. Watch COMSPOC Video.
Background:
Recent Activity
Editor’s Comment: Now we wait to see what China does next with each of these satellites. Barring any official announcement from China related to refueling success, our only indications will be from subsequent maneuvering. I’ll be watching for indications of SJ-25 maneuvering to get co-planar with other Chinese satellites. I believe the most likely re-fueling targets are SJ-23, SY-12 01 or 02, & TJS-3. Currently SJ-23 is in the closest orbital plane with SJ-25 with a ~1.5° inclination difference & 18.3° RAAN difference. I will also be looking for potential orbital debris test objects for SJ-21 to attempt to capture (this assumes a successful refueling mission).
1 Dec 2025: After writing articles related to China’s three YG-40 launches to 86.0° inclination and their 6 launches of Guowang satellites to 86.5° inclined orbits I decided to do a comparison. With some help from the COMSPOC_OPS team the results were interesting. The three sets of YG-40 triplets are orbiting in equilateral triangle formations at an average altitude of 851.2km. They are operating in 3 orbital planes all inclined 86.0° with a RAAN offset of ~37°. China has launched 50 Guowang (China SatNet) satellites into 86.5°inclinations, all of which are now orbiting at an 1,167.9km average altitude. They are spread across 6 orbital planes, each plane with 86.5° inclination and a RAAN offset of ~30°. The orbital comparison reveals the YG-40 satellites gradually drift to the west of the Guowang spacecraft as a result of differing RAAN precession rates. I had previously reported that China had placed its YG-40 satellites into a near polar orbit in order to improve its RF detection/geolocation at the higher latitudes. Now I’m wondering if YG-40’s orbit also allows it to use the Guowang satellite mesh network to quickly relay information to Chinese ground stations. Watch COMSPOC Video.
– As you all know from several of Jack Anthony’s previous articles, objects orbiting at different altitudes will have different orbital periods (10:1 rule) and daily RAAN drifts (J2 effect).
– As evidenced from the COMSPOC video, YG-40 satellites are slowly “twisting” to the west underneath their Guowang counterparts. Such an orbital relationship places YG-40 satellites within line-of-site of the Guowang mesh network which could conceivably relay YG-40 data to Chinese based ground stations in a fraction of the time required to use one of the GEO based Guowang or Tianlian satellites.
– China has released little information regarding its YG-40 satellites. Based on their equilateral triangle formation they are believed to be RF detection/geolocation sensors. China operates other satellites (YG-31 among others) in these formations.
– We cannot confirm YG-40 satellites are equipped with inter-satellite links, however China’s desire to expand its ISR coverage along with investments in the required technologies suggest China would be motivated to include inter-satellite connectivity into satellites such as the YG-40.
– To meet Guowang’s global connectivity requires China to pursue a mesh network architecture.
of remote sensing, communications, and navigation satellites” (通导遥一体化), a prospect made somewhat simpler by having a robust LCT industry.”
– Blaine also notes there has been a surge of investment into Chinese laser companies for the past 2-3 years: ”2024 was clearly a banner year with ~US$130M of money thrown at laser companies, 2025 is shaping up to be even bigger, with >US$80M raised in the first half of the year.”
– Additional points from (friend of the Flash) Stephen Clark in his 20 Aug 2025 Ars Technica article:
Editor’s Comment: China has long promoted the idea of a “Space Brain” in which the integration of space-based capabilities results in better and faster actionable information. YG-40’s orbital relationship with the Guowang architecture suggests China is developing the capability to rapidly relay RF detection & Geolocation to Chinese based ground stations (and we assume Chinese weapon systems such as the DF-21 and DF-26). In doing so China can expand its ISR coverage while improving latency and data security…in other words, China is able to improve its “kill web.”
5 Dec 2025: As predicted in the 23 November 2025 Flash, China has placed its newly launched TJS-21 (66586) into a Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) and synchronized its orbit phase with Shiyan-10 02 (54878). The two satellites have a RAAN difference of ~180°, resulting in both satellites reaching their apogees at nearly the same time. This configuration matches what China has done with TJS-13 (62188) and Shiyan-10 01 (49258). As a result China now has 24/7 dual satellite coverage of the northern high latitudes. Furthermore, screen captures from Chinese mission control during the TJS-13 launch (thank you Andrew Jones!) seem to show a missile warning satellite. Having two missile tracking satellites permanently perched over the northern hemisphere provides China with greater missile tracking accuracy and confidence levels. Combining with other open source information it now appears China has at least 3 GEO based missile warning satellites, TJS-2 (41911), TJS-5 (44978), and TJS-6 (47613) to go along with its 4 HEO satellites. By comparison the US Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) consists of 6 GEO and 4 HEO satellites.
30 Nov 2025: China launched a Long March-7A with Shijian-28 (66549) satellite from Wenchang. According to official sources, the satellite “has entered its preset orbit successfully”. The satellite has not been entered into the space-track.org catalog as of 5 Dec 2025. We’ll report more on this launch as more orbital information is collected/released. For now we’ll have to make do with launch images and mission patches. Launch Video.
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26 November 2025: Newsweek’s reporter Micah McCartney states Chinese researchers are actively studying how to conduct large-scale electronic warfare against SpaceX’s Starlink constellation, running simulations that model how high-altitude jammers could disrupt the network. Their tests indicate that nearly 1,000 drones or balloons equipped with jamming payloads could create an electromagnetic shield capable of degrading Starlink coverage over an area the size of Taiwan. Beijing views Starlink as a national security concern due to its global footprint and its demonstrated wartime value in Ukraine. These findings highlight China’s growing investment in counter-space electronic warfare and its interest in neutralizing Western commercial space assets during a regional conflict.
Key findings from the Chinese article “The US Starlink Project and Its Implications from the Perspective of International and National Security” – Translated by CSIS
China has rapidly advanced its high-power microwave (HPM) weapons programs through decades of state-funded research, including major investments under the 863 Program. Early PLA assessments in the mid-2000s concluded that effective HPM countermeasures were technically feasible, driving sustained development that has since produced miniaturized, ship-mounted HPM systems and multiple operational anti-drone weapons debuting in 2024. China has also improved synchronization technologies to support precision HPM strikes while simultaneously expanding Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) shielding and hardening of warships, aircraft, and critical infrastructure. Together, these efforts reflect a maturing offensive and defensive HPM/EMP ecosystem designed to operate effectively in contested electromagnetic environments.
At the strategic level, China views high-altitude electro-magnetic pulse (HEMP) weapons as an asymmetric “assassin’s mace” capable of crippling technologically advanced adversaries and shaping the battlespace before kinetic conflict begins. With delivery systems such as the DF-17 and plans to expand its nuclear arsenal, the PRC integrates HEMP into its broader cyber-electro-magnetic-space warfare doctrine as a means to paralyze satellite networks, command-and-control systems, and ISR architectures essential to modern military operations. These investments signal China’s ambition to dominate high-intensity electronic warfare, leveraging coordinated HPM/HEMP attacks to disrupt, degrade, and potentially neutralize adversary capabilities in the opening moments of conflict.
