ISSUE 147 | 14 jun 2026
The integrity flash
Analysis of Developments in the Space Domain
In This Issue
SJ-29A/B Conduct Synchronized Maneuvers
28 May – 2 June 2026: Over the past several months I’ve been keeping an eye out for SJ-29A/B (67302 & 67403) activity. China launched SJ-29A/B on 30 Dec 2025 on a LM-7A from Wenchang and the launch grabbed world attention (at least among the space nerd crowd) when China publicly announced SJ-29A/B were intended to conduct “technology verification for space target detection.”
After entering GEO in early January the satellites orbited as a paired GEO test system near ~73.0°E with separation in the ~10–90 km range from one another, with SJ-29A just west of SJ-29B. The US has maneuvered two of its GSSAP satellites, first USA 325 and then USA 324 to monitor both SJ-29A/B. Neither SJ-29A or B appears to have maneuvered from January through late-May.
This changed on 28 May as Chinese space operators increased the SMA for both SJ-29 satellites ~17km generating a westward drift of 0.2° per day. On 31 May China reduced the SMA by ~17km and eliminated the drift. At first glance this appeared to be China conducting minor maneuvers for station keeping purposes as the pair had naturally drifted from 73.0°E to 73.9°E at the time of the maneuver. The maneuvers resulted in a 0.6° move to the west and by 3 June 2026 both satellites were located at 73.3°E. They are currently just 1km above GEO and drifting 0.008° west/day.
On closer examination this may have been more than just East/West station keeping. Namely, after 2 Jun 2026 SJ-29A and 29B were orbiting much closer to one another than previously. Looking at absolute distance (includes In-Track, Cross-Track and Radial Track separation) the two satellites were predictably 10-90km apart from 20-25 May. Compare this with results from 28 May – 13 Jun and we see the pair are consistently 30-35km apart. There were a few instances during the maneuver period where the satellites appear to be well within 5km of one another.
It appears the US remains interested in the SJ-29 pair. Based on 12 Jun 2026 orbital data, USA 324 (51280) maneuvered along with 29A/B and maintained a good position to image both SJ-29A & B. Each day at ~0815Z and ~2015Z USA 325 is <50km from SJ-29A and <60km from SJ-29B with optimal lighting conditions to image both satellites. This appears to be an improved tactical situation than previously reported when USA 325 (another US GSSAP satellite) only had favorable lighting conditions for imagine one of the SJ-29 satellites during each point of closest approach. Watch COMSPOC Video & notice USA 324 originally drifts west of SJ-29A/B then course corrects to rejoin the pair.
Jan-Jun 2026: SMA (black) and Longitude Location (green) for SJ-29A (celestrak.org)
22 May – 5 Jun 2026: SJ-29A In-Track Manuevers Change Location from 73.9°E to 73.3°E (celestrak.org)
22 May – 5 Jun 2026: SJ-29B In-Track Manuevers Change Location from 73.9°E to 73.3°E (celestrak.org)
12 Jun 2026: Overview of SJ-29A/B and USA 324 Orbits (saberastro.com)
As SJ-29A/B Head South USA 324 is <50km from 29A and <60km from 29B with Optimal Lighting Conditions for Imaging Both (saberastro.com)
As SJ-29A/B Head North USA 324 is <50km from 29A & <60km from 29B with Optimal Lighting Conditions for Imaging Both (saberastro.com)
27 May – 13 Jun 2026: Total/Radial/In/Cross-Track (TRIC) Plot for SJ-29A and SJ-29B
Post 28 Maneuvers Satellites Maintain 28-36km Separation
(Prior to Maneuver Variance was 24-96km) (saberastro.com)
TJS-11 Moves West
15 Jun 2026: For the first time since it settled into Geosynchronous orbit in early March 2024, China maneuvered TJS-11 (59020). Chinese space operators increased the satellite’s average altitude 58km to generate a westward drift. From 27 May – 11 Jun TJS-11’s position changed from 120.3°E to 112.6°E (a total distance of ~5,664km). As of orbital data from 15 June, TJS-11 had returned to Geosynchronous altitude and appears to be parked at 112.6°E.
– China launched TJS-11 on 23 Feb 2024 using the LM-5 with the extended fairing. At the time this was just the second time China had used extended fairing configuration (the first was Yaogan-41 on 15 Dec 2023).
- TJS-11 was the first TJS satellite to launch on the LM-5.
- The extended fairing is 18.5m in height compared with the 12.3m standard fairing.
– China released little information regarding the satellite’s mission, stating it would be mainly used to carry out multi-band, high-speed satellite communication technology verification.
-Maneuver Timeline
- 27 May – 5 Jun: SME +58km (0.45°/day west)
- 7 Jun: SME -30km (0.35°/day west)
- 9-15 Jun: SME -33km (no drift)
– TJS-11 for its first 26 months TJS-11 had been ~3° west of Yaogan-41, I did not see any interesting new neighbors in its new location, the nearest satellites appear to be: 1) Telkomsat 113BT (Indonesian COMSAT launched 2024); 2) PSN N5 (Indonesian COMSAT launched 2025); 3) Koreasat-5 (South Korean COMSAT launched 2006); and 4) Koreasat-5A (South Korean COMSAT launched in 2017).
23 Feb 2024: LM-5 w/ Extended Fairing Lifts Off with TJS-1 (spacenews.com)
Pattern-of-Life Change: TJS-11 Conducted First Non-Station Keeping Maneuvers in Over 2 Years, Remains ~33km Above GEO (celestrak.org)
China Conducted a Series of In-Track Maneuvers & Is Relocating TJS-11 to the West of its previous position (saberastro.com)
China: TJS-24 Arrives in GEO
5 June 2026: After spending ~10 days in Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO) Chinese space operators circularized TJS-24’s (69235) orbit and parked the satellite in Geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at 90.3°E longitude. With an inclination of near 0° TJS-24 is in Geostationary Orbit (a specific variant of GEO). China parked TJS-24 to the west of TJS-10 and east of TJS-4. I didn’t see any other satellites of interest in its neighborhood. China provided the identical mission description, “mainly used for verification of multi-band, high-speed satellite communication technologies” for the following satellites: 1) TJS-10; 2) TJS-11; 3) TJS-15; 4) TJS-16; 5) TJS-17; 6) TJS-19; 7) TJS-20; 8) TJS-23; and 9) TJS-24.
Transition from GTO (top) to Geostationary (below)
Late May TJS-24 In GTO: Inclination = 19.5° Eccentricity = .73 Apogee = 35,858km Perigee = 176.7km
5 June 2026 in GEO: Inclination = 0° Eccentricity = 0 Apogee = 35,790km Perigee = 35,783km (saberastro.com & celestrak.com)
11 June 2026: China launced a LM-5 equipped with an extended fairing and TJS-25 (69474) from Wenchang. According to official sources, the satellite entered the planned orbit and “will be mainly used to carry out multi-band and high-speed communication technology validation tests”. TJS-25 will likely spend ~10 days in Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO) before Chinese space operators circularize its orbit and park the satellite into its GEO slot. China provided the identical mission description for the following satellites: 1) TJS-10; 2) TJS-11; 3) TJS-15; 4) TJS-16; 5) TJS-17; 6) TJS-19; 7) TJS-20; 8) TJS-23; 9) TJS-24; and TJS-25. The following TJS satellites have also used the LM-5 with extended fairing: 1) TJS-11; 2) TJS-20 (66142); 3) TJS-23 (67226); and 4) TJS-25. Launch Video.
– A geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO) is a highly elliptical Earth orbit used as an intermediate step to place satellites into geosynchronous or geostationary orbit.
- TJS-25 is currently in a highly elliptical orbit (e=.76) with an apogee of 45,755km and perigee of only 224.1km.
– TJS-20, 23 & 25 all launched with the LM-5 with an extended fairing suggesting related missions…they also boast similar mission patches.
- TJS-20 is located at 62.4°E with an inclination of 5.5° and RAAN of 300°
- TJS-23 is located at 175.5°E with an inclination of 5.6° and RAAN of 297°.
- If China decides to place TJS-25 equal distance from the TJS-20 & 23 it would place the satellite at ~119°E. We’ll be able to confirm in about 2 weeks. Of note this will be ~1° from the location just vacated by TJS-11.
LM-5 With Extended Fairing Prepares to Launch TJS-25 from Wenchang (nasaspaceflight.com)
Birds of a Feather? TJS-20, 23 & 25 All Launched Using LM-5 With Extended Fairing
(nasaspaceflight.com)
11 Jun 2026: First Observation of TJS-25 in GTO
Eccentricity = .76 Apogee = 45,755km Perigee = 224.1km (celestrak.org & saberastro.com)
China’s Growing TJS Catalog (14 of 23 Have Publicly Unknown Missions)
(Gunther’s Space Page, Celestrak.org)
31 May 2026: China launched a LM-2D with 4 Guowang Test Satellites (69320-69323) from Xichang. According to official sources, the satellites entered their preset orbits successfully. This launch appears similar to China’s launches on 1 April 2025 (HJS-6A-D) and 24 April 2026 (HJS-9A-D). Both previous launches used LM-2Ds and carried 4 test satellites to 55° inclined orbits. This latest group was released at a similar average altitude as HJS-6 (450km) and lower than HJS-9 (505km). Launch Video.
– 69320-23 are inclined at 55.0° and have SMAs of ~449km.
- 69320-23 had a 1.4° east RAAN offset with HJS-6 on 6 Jun. However due to SMA differences 69320-23 are moving westward (RAAN precession) & toward HJS-6 orbit plane at a rate of 0.1° per day. This group will end up west of the HJS-6 group (see graphic)
– By my count, with this launch there are now 27 Guowang test satellites in orbit.
– Comparing the “Low Fliers”
- China has launched 3 Groups of 4 Satellites into orbits about ½ the average altitude of operational Guowang satellites. All used LM-2Ds.
- They are likely testing China SatNet’s plans to develop/implement an “inner shell” of communication satellites.
- Test Group 1 HJS-6B-D (63429-31): launched on 1 April 2025 from Jiuquan.
- Consists of only 3 satellites as 63428 failed and re-entered on 16 Oct 2025.
- The three remaining satellite are currently conducting a series of maneuvers to increase their SMA ~50km to an identical 501km. Orbit raising appears to be ongoing. I expect them to cease SMA increases once they match HJS-9 satellites.
- Test Group 2 HJS-9A-D (68831-34): launched 24 April 2026 from Xichang.
- All 4 satellites remain in orbit and are actively maneuvering. SMAs range from 507-508km so relative positions are slowly changing.
- There is currently an ~6° west RAAN offset from Test Group 1.
- Test Group 3: 69320-69323
- Satellites released at ~450km. No maneuvers detected as of 6 June (not unusual).
- There is currently a 1.4° east RAAN offset with HJS-6 which is gradually decreasing at a rate of 0.1°/day.
- Unknown which orbital plane China intends to place Test Group 3. Depending on rate/timing of SMA increases they could end up west of both HJS-6 & HJS-9 satellites. Timing of SMA increases will tell the story. By comparison HJS-6 satellites have been increasing SMA for ~90 days. HJS-9 satellites were launched to their operational SMAs
Launch Montage: LM-2D Successful Launch of 4 Guowang Test Satellites (nasaspaceflight.com)
6 Jun 2026: Newest Test Satellites (69320-23) have Identical Inclination (55°) and an 1.4° East RAAN Offset from HJS-6 Satellites Launched 1 Apr 2025 (saberastro.com)
6 Jun 2026 Orbital Close Up: 69320-23 Orbit West Precession is ~0.1°/day Greater than HJS-6 Precession & Will Slowly Close 1.4° Offset. (saberastro.com)
Guowang (China SatNet) Test Launch Summary:
– Per Andrew Jones SpaceNews Article from Apr 2021:
- Spectrum allocation filings submitted to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) by China in September 2020 revealed plans to construct two similarly named “GW” low Earth orbit constellations totaling 12,992 satellites.
- The filings indicate plans for GW to consist of sub-constellations ranging from 500-1,145 kilometers in altitude with inclinations between 30-85 degrees. The satellites would operate across a range of frequency bands.
– Guowang Test Launch Summary: China has conducted 10 test launches. 3 launches to 86.5° Inclination, 4 launches to 50.0° inclination, and 3 launches to 55.0° inclination.
- Test Launch 1* (9 Jul 2023): 2 sats (57288 & 57289) on LM-2C from Jiquan.
- 86.5° inclination, 1,111km SMA
- Test Launch 2* (23 Nov 2023): 3 sats (58425, 58426, 58427) on LM-2D from Xichang
- 50.0° inclination, 1,104km SMA
- Test Launch 3* (5 Dec 2023): 1 sat (58505) on Jielong-3 from Yellow Sea.
- 86.5° inclination, 1,111km SMA
- Test Launch 4* (30 Dec 2023): 3 sats (58691, 58692, 58693) on LM-2C from Jiuquan
- 50.0° inclination, 1,104km SMA
- Test Launch 5 (30 Nov 2024) 1 sat (62186) on LM-2C from Wenchang
- 50.0° inclination, 1,104km SMA
- Test Launch 6 (1 Apr 2024): 4 sats (63428-63431) on LM-2D from Jiuquan
- 55.0° inclination, 450-470km SMA
- 63428 de-orbited 16 Oct 2025
- 63429, 63430, 63431 have recently increased SMA from ~450km to 495.5km
- Test Launch 7 (16 Sep 2025): 4 sats (65617-65620) on LM-2C from Jiuquan
- 50.0° inclination, 1,104km SMA
- Test Launch 8 (11 Apr 2026): 1 sat (68687) on Jielong-3 from Yellow Sea
- 86.5° inclination, 1,004km SMA (will likely raise to 1,111km over time…)
- Test Launch 9 (24 Apr 2026): 4 sats (68831-68834) on LM-2D from Xichang
- 55.0° inclination, ~507km SMA
- Test Launch 10 (31 May 2026): 4 sats (69320-69323) on LM-2D from Xichang
- 55.0° inclination, ~450km SMA
* Denotes launches occurring prior to first operational LEO Guowang launch 16 Dec 2024
Launch 1: 1 Jun 2026: China launched its first Long March-12B with 2 SpaceSail Qianfan satellites (69325-69326) from Jiuquan. I’m following a nasaspaceflight.com discussion group and labeling these two satellites as “Group 8”. According to CASC, the Long March-12B is a new-generation reusable rocket, but no recovery test was conducted during this mission, “a first-stage recovery test is scheduled to be carried out at a later date”. The previous 9 Qianfan launches had each carried 18 satellites to orbit. Qianfan 163/164 are co-planar with the satellites from Group 5 which launched on 11 Mar 2025 on a LM-8. Of note, Group 5 had 2 of its 18 satellites fail to reach their operating altitude of 1,069km. SpaceSail may intend for Qianfan 163/164 may serve as replacements. Launch Video.
The LM-12B was able to release Qianfan 163/164 at an average altitude of 1,034km, only 35km shy of the 1,069km operational orbit. This is far closer than the LM-6A and LM-8 Qianfan launches which typically release their payloads at ~810km. Releasing Qianfan 163/164 into a higher orbit will decrease the time required for the satellites to reach their operational SMA.
I had hoped that China would change its practice of leaving its massive/uncontrolled objects (we talked about this in the 19 May Flash) with the LM-12B. Alas, this was not the case. The spent upper stage (69327) is now in a 732×1,022km orbit. Per Dr Darren McKnight of LEO labs the upperstage will gradually decay for the next “200-400 years.” Awesome.
Launch 2: 4 Jun 2026: China launched a LM-6A with 18 Qianfan satellites (69382-69399)from Taiyuan. Official sources labelled this batch “Group 11.” Group 11 filled the remaining unoccupied orbital plane (see graphic). Upperstage left in 773x631km orbit where it will be a hazard for decades. Launch Video.
Launch 3: 5 Jun 2026: China launched a LM-8 with 18 Qianfan satellites (2026-125) from Wenchang. Official sources labelled this batch as “Group 12.” As of 14 Jun 2026 the satellites had not been cataloged. Launch Video.
Launch 4: 9 Jun 2026: China launched a ZhuQue-2E (ZQ-2E) Y6 with 1 Qianfan Direct to Cell (DTC 01) test satellite and the China Mobile 02 test satellite. (69472-69473). Both objects were placed into a 400km orbit with 55° inclination. Note, I’m not going to include these satellites in overall count or orbital graphics. Launch Video.
There are now 200 Qianfan satellites in orbit. Of the 12 Qianfan launches 7 have used the LM-6A from Taiyuan, 4 have used the LM-8 from Hainan (Wenchang) and one has used the LM-12B from Jiuquan.
New Details from China in Space: “Each Qianfan satellite is believed to weigh 300 kilograms with a ‘flat pack’ design, with a single solar array, to fit as many satellites as possible inside the rocket fairing in two parallel stacks. For maneuvering in orbit, each satellite has an electric hall-effect thruster burning krypton to generate 20 millinewtons of thrust, with a specific impulse of 1,385 seconds.”
– All Qianfan planes are inclined 89° with a 20° of RAAN offset between each plane. With the Group 11 launch, 9 planes are in use. SpaceSail may augment Group 2 due to 15 of 18 satellites failing to reach their operational SMA of 1,069km.
Constellation Summary:
– Of 200 Qianfan satellites on orbit, 87 have reached their operational altitudes of 1,069kms.
- Group 1 (60379-60396) (LM-6A launched 6 Aug 2024) : 17 of 18 satellites reached operational SMA. Qianfan 7 (60385) has not maneuvered and may be inoperable.
- Group 2 (61552-61569) (LM-6A launched 15 Oct 2024): Only 3 of 18 satellites (Qianfan 29, 30 & 32) reached their operational SMA.
- Group 3 (62238-62255) (LM-6A launched 5 Dec 2024): 16 of 18 satellites reached their operational SMA. Qianfan 39 (807km) & 42 (810km) likely inoperable. Group 3 is co-planar with Group 10.
- Group 4 (62785-62802)(LM-6A launched 23 Jan 2025) : 18 of 18 satellites reached their operational SMA.
- Group 5 (63159-63176) (LM-8 launched 11 Mar 2025): 16 of 18 satellites reached their operational SMA. Qianfan 77 (904km) & 83 (1,028km) likely inoperable. Co-planar w/ Group 8.
- Group 6 (66033-66050) (LM-6A launched 17 Oct 2025): 17 of 18 satellites reached their operational SMA. Qianfan 101 (66043) (800km) likely inoperable.
- Group 7 (68636-68653): (LM-8 launched 7 Apr 2026): All 18 satellites in process of raising their SMA. Range 1,024-1,063km as of 11 Jun 2026.
- Group 9 (69073-69090): (LM-6 launched 12 May 2026): 17 of 18 satellites in process of raising their SMA. Qianfan 137 (69083) lagging. Range 850-880km as of 11 Jun 2026.
- Group 10 (69104-69121): (LM-8 launched 17 May 2026): All 18 satellites in process of raising their SMA. Initial SMA range is 825-850km. Group 10 is co-planar with Group 3.
- Group 8 (69325-69326): (LM-12B launched 1 Jun 2026): Two satellites launched to 1,034km. Both satellites are in the process of raising their altitudes. Co-planar with Group 5.
- Group 11 (69382-69399): (LM-6A launched 4 Jun 2026): All 18 satellites in process of raising their SMA. Initial SMA range is 805-807km.
- Group 12 (2026-125, SATNOS Not Assigned as of 14 Jun 2026): (LM-8 launched 5 Jun 2026)
Current Qianfan Constellation consists of 200 satellites operating in 9 orbital planes. Planes are inclined 89° & separated by ~20° RAAN. (saberastro.com)
LM-12B Lift Off from Jiuquan with Qianfan Group 8 (left)
Qianfan Deployment (above) (nasaspaceflight.com)
LM-8 Just Prior to Lift Off from Wenchang with Qianfan Group 12 (above) Qianfan Group 12 in Fairing Heads to Launch Site (right) (nasaspaceflight.com)
ZQ-2E Lift Off (above) with Qianfan Direct to Cell (DTC 01) test satellite (top right) and China Mobile 02 test satellite (below right) (nasaspaceflight.com)
12 June 2026: The Joint Commercial Operations Cell (JCO) reported several <5km points of closest approach between Luch (Olymp) 2 (55841) and Intelsat 39 (44476). Luch (Olymp) 2 is a suspected Russian signals intelligence satellite which maneuvers around the GEO belt stopping for months at a time in vicinity of western communications satellites. Luch (Olymp) 2 has been operating just east of Intelsat 39 since early March 2025. Average separation between the two objects was between 10-60km.
Due to Luch (Olymp) 2 maneuvers the two satellites had a close approaches <5km from 2-4 June. JCO reported that at one point (2 Jun 2026 @ 0812UTC) the two satellites were separated by <1km. Luch (Olymp) 2 maneuvered again on 3 Jun and began to separate by ~1.5km per day. For its part Intelsat 39 conducted a maneuver on 4 Jun 0913UTC. As of 5 June the objects were separated by ~19km and separating ~4km per day separation.
TLE data shows the two satellites were again <5km apart on 8 June 2026 (~0907UTC).
For a complete history of Luch activities please check out Marco Longbroek’s blog entries on the topic. Ars Technica also did a nice write up in Feb 2026 based on a Financial Times investigation. Excerpts from Ars Technica article (editor’s note: Luch 1 (40258) is now in Graveyard Orbit):
- “Russian space vehicles have shadowed European satellites more intensively over the past three years, at a time of high tension between the Kremlin and the West following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.”
- “For several years, military and civilian space authorities in the West have been tracking the activities of Luch-1 and Luch-2—two Russian objects that have carried out repeated suspicious maneuvers in orbit.”
- “Both vehicles have made risky close approaches to some of Europe’s most important geostationary satellites…Since its launch in 2023, Luch-2 has approached 17 European satellites…Both satellites are suspected of “doing SIGINT [signals intelligence] business,” Major General Michael Traut, head of the German military’s space command.”
- A “European intelligence official said the Luch vehicles were almost certainly intended to position themselves within the narrow cone of data beams transmitted from Earth-based stations to the satellites…The official expressed concern that sensitive information—notably command data for European satellites—is unencrypted, because many were launched years ago without advanced onboard computers or encryption capabilities.”
- “Luch 1 and Luch 2 are unlikely to have the capability to jam or destroy satellites themselves, the European intelligence official said. However, they have probably provided Russia with large amounts of data on how such systems could be disrupted, both from the ground and in orbit.”
- “Maj. Gen. Traut said he presumed the Luch satellites had intercepted the ‘command link’ of the satellites they approached—the channel linking satellites to ground controllers that allows orbital adjustments.”
- “Analysts say that with such information, Russia could mimic ground operators, beaming false commands to satellites to manipulate their thrusters used for minor orbital adjustments.”
Financial Times Graphic (www.ft.com)
31 May – 12 Jun 2026: SMA History for Luch (Olymp) 2 (purple) &
Intelsat 39 (red) (saberastro.com)
2 Jun 2026: <5km Point of Closest Approach (saberastro.com)
31 May – 4 Jun Absolute Separation Between Luch (Olymp) 2 & Intelsat 39 (saberastro.com)
6 June 2026: @NatSecLedger released an article on X describing the significance of the FY2027 budget for the US Space Force. The authors maintain that the budget signals the assumption that sensor and the shooter occupy the same airspace is heading for retirement. Excerpts below, read the full article here.
– “The next generation kill chain doesn’t start with a fighter. It starts with radars in orbit, a constellation of relay satellites, and a data mesh built to survive jamming.”
– “The FY2027 Space Force procurement and R&D budgets…directly enables the Long Range Kill Chain…The Space Force RDT&E budget contains a program element…called Long Range Kill Chains. Its FY2027 funding request is $1.39 billion.”
– “The Space Force’s LRKC program element funds three projects: the data relay infrastructure needed to move targeting data at operational speeds, support for Golden Dome for America, and a new-start program to develop Space Based Interceptors capable of countering intercontinental ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles.”
– “The Space Force is building the sensor and data transport architecture that makes the kill chain possible. The Air Force is building and validating the systems that close it.”
– “The FY2027 procurement budget requests $7.06 billion in mandatory funding to expand the Space-Based Air Moving Target Indicator, known as SB-AMTI, from regional to global coverage…against a peer adversary with the reach and the intent to hold those platforms at risk, neither the E-7 nor any ground-based radar is survivable enough to serve as the primary sensor for the most contested missions.”
– “Twenty-one S-Band relay satellites, each costing roughly eleven and a half million dollars, are being procured for delivery by end of calendar year 2027…these satellites exist to ‘rapidly move target data around the globe and execute long range kill chains.’”
– “The Space Data Network now carries its own dedicated funding line, separated from the Long Range Kill Chains program as it matures. That is a bureaucratic signal that the data backbone has graduated from concept to infrastructure.”
– “The concept of operations that emerges from this architecture breaks several assumptions…A target found by an orbital sensor, tracked continuously regardless of weather or time of day, with a track delivered through a low-latency pLEO network, can be engaged by a platform that never needed to see it directly.”
– “Because the sensor layer is in orbit and the data layer is proliferated, the same targeting picture reaches any platform connected to the network simultaneously: an F-35, a Collaborative Combat Aircraft three hundred miles away, a naval platform in a different sea, a ground-based launcher on allied territory.”
“The kill chain the joint force is building does not start with an aircraft anymore. It starts with an orbital sensor that cannot be outmaneuvered by geography and does not require overflight rights. The data it generates travels through a proliferated network that cannot be disabled by a single counterspace weapon. The shooter at the end of that chain could be anywhere.”
Pics o’ the Fortnight!
Handy Reference of China’s 4 Major Launch Sites (wikipedia.com)
“Russia launched 16 Rassvet-3 comms sats on Mar 23. One of them appears to have failed immediately and reentered today over the North Atlantic. Six are raising orbits; eight others are making small maintenance burns. The remaining sat last reboosted on May 8,may also be in trouble” (@planet4589 via X)
“Updates of the possible CZ-9 specs through the factory’s blueprints. Body diameter: 10.6m; Engine Max diameter:11.6m; Fairing diameter:15m, Length 37m. The 3 stage varient could be as tall as 185m.” (@raz_liu via X)
No Comment Required
(@wtfcetialpha5 via X)
Bucket List Item: Viewing Tanegashima Launch (https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16639430)
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